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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 Guatemala is not a failed state and is unlikely to become 
one in the near future.  Although the state currently fails 
to provide adequate security to its citizens or an 
appropriate range of effective social programs, it does 
supply a functioning electoral democracy, sound 
economic management, and a promising new anti-
poverty program, My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO). 
 Guatemala is a weak state.  The principal security threats 
represented by expanding Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs), criminal parallel powers, and 
urban gangs have overwhelmed the resources of the 
under-resourced and compromised criminal justice 
system.  The UN-sponsored International Commission 
against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), however, has 
demonstrated that progress against organized crime is 
possible. 
 The principal obstacles to strengthening the Guatemalan 
state lie in the traditional economic elite’s resistance to 
taxation and the venal political class’ narrow focus on 
short-term interests.  Guatemala lacks a strong, policy-
oriented, mass-based political party that could develop a 
coherent national reform program and mobilize public 
support around it.  
 The United States should strengthen the Guatemalan 
state by expanding the Central America Regional 
Security Initiative (CARSI) and by strongly supporting 
CICIG, MIFAPRO, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
(TSE). 
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INTRODUCTION: FAILED STATES 
 
In 2007, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Anders 
Kompass publically labeled Guatemala a failed and 
collapsed state.  Other observers1 both inside and outside the 
country have reached similar conclusions.  With Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations holding sway over large 
sections of the nation, street gangs running rampant in 
Guatemala City, and one of the world’s highest homicide 
rates, such characterizations are understandable.  However, 
calling Guatemala a failed state is an exaggeration.   As 
serious as the nation’s security problems are, the Guatemalan 
state is not nearing collapse.  Indeed, it provides capable 
macroeconomic management and the highest level of 
electoral democracy since the early 1950s.  In addition, after 
decades of woefully inadequate efforts to address the needs 
of the nation’s poor majority, social policy is finally making 
progress via a new conditional cash transfer (CCT) program.  
Risks of future state failure cannot be ignored, but 
Guatemala does not yet resemble failed states such as 
Zimbabwe or the Congo, much less Somalia. 
 
Guatemala is a weak state that is performing poorly in many 
policy areas, but adequately in others.  Its most serious 
vulnerabilities lie in the security area.  Criminal activity has 
become so widespread that it has overwhelmed efforts by 
state authorities to bring it under control. Police and military 
forces are small, underpaid, poorly trained, and infiltrated by 
criminal elements.  Too many prosecutors and judges have 
been intimidated, corrupted, or killed.  Guatemala may not 
be a failed state, but it is failing at the critical task of 
providing public order and the rule of law to its 14 million 
citizens.  Moreover, this failure threatens to undermine the 
                                                             
1 Gustavo González, “Guatemala: estado fallido,” La República, June 25, 
2010; M. A. Bastenier, “¿Guatemala, estado fallido?” El País, January 
21, 2008. 
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nation’s progress in electoral politics as money from drug 
trafficking seeps into campaign finance.  Guatemala’s 
deteriorating security situation also facilitates the northward 
flow of narcotics and illegal immigrants that the United 
States is struggling to contain.  To prevent further 
deterioration, the United States and its allies should expand 
the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to 
provide more assistance to reform and strengthen 
Guatemala’s law enforcement capabilities.  Additional 
support also should be directed at consolidating 
improvements in social policy and in the conduct of 
elections.    
 
There is no consensus definition of a failed state.  Analysts 
use the term in different ways and apply varying criteria for 
state failure.  The London School of Economics’ (LSE) 
Crisis States Research Center, for example, defines a failed 
state simply as one that has collapsed and “… that can no 
longer perform its basic security and development functions 
and that has no effective control over its territory and 
borders.” 2  Rotberg,3 however, distinguishes among strong, 
weak, failed, and collapsed states.  He evaluates states by the 
degree to which they deliver the most crucial political goods:  
most importantly security, followed by political freedoms, 
then by goods such as education, health care, and economic 
opportunity.  Strong states like those in Scandinavia perform 
well across all categories, weak states show a mixed profile, 
and failed states such as the Congo provide none or almost 
none of these political goods.  According to Rotberg, most 
failed states are convulsed by internal violence and/or ruled 
                                                             
2 Jonathan Di John, Conceptualizing the Causes and Consequences of 
Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature, Crisis States Working 
Papers Series, No. 2 (London: LSE Development Studies Institute, 
January 2008), 9-10. 
3 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: 
Causes and Indicators,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 
ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, IN: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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by despotic regimes.  Rare collapsed states like Somalia fail 
in every respect and can be completely destroyed by 
violence.  In spite of its security crisis, Guatemala does not, 
as yet, meet either the LSE or the less stringent Rotberg 
definition of a failed state.   The country ranks 73rd of 177 
nations (Somalia ranks first) on the 2011 Failed States 
Index,4 scoring about the same as China, a result that earns 
only a warning of possible future state failure.  Guatemala 
appears to be most accurately classified as one of Rotberg’s 
weak states that are failing at some of their essential tasks.   
 
INSECURITY 
 
In many ways, Guatemala is more dangerous today than it 
was during all but the most intense periods of its more than 
30 years of guerrilla war (1960s-1996).  From 2000 to 2010, 
the nation’s homicide rate doubled to 50 per 100,000, 
equivalent to ten times the U.S. level.  Forty percent of 
murders are attributed to the narcotics trade,5 and fewer than 
four percent result in an arrest and conviction.  Significant 
quantities of narcotics have been moving across Guatemala 
since the 1980s, but the drug traffic has skyrocketed in recent 
years.  An estimated 250 to 350 metric tons of cocaine now 
transit Guatemala annually.   The greatest number of cocaine 
shipments arrives from Colombia or Ecuador by sea on the 
largely unpatrolled Pacific coast where they are broken up 
into smaller packages for the trip to Mexico by truck.  Air 
routes to the Petén and Alta Verapaz as well as land routes 
from Honduras are also important.  In addition, Guatemala 
exports a small poppy crop for heroin production and 
imports large quantities of pseudoephedrine for shipment to 
                                                             
4 Fund for Peace, accessed on June 23, 2011, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/?q=fsi.  
5 The Economist, “The Tormented Isthmus,” April 16, 2011, 26. 
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Mexico for processing into methamphetamine.6  The porous 
Guatemalan-Mexican border poses no obstacle. 
 
Traditionally, Guatemalan “transportista” crime families 
have handled the movement of cocaine through the country 
for international drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), but 
since about 2006 Mexican DTOs, particularly the infamous 
Zetas, have begun to exert more direct control.  The Zetas 
have also carried their battle with the Sinaloa cartel into 
Guatemala as both organizations have moved some 
operations there (training camps, arms caches, safe houses) 
in response to Mexico’s intensified anti-drug campaign.  The 
Zetas’ violent conflicts with their enemies have caused a 
rising body count.  Mexican DTOs also engage in a variety 
of other criminal activities in Guatemala including human 
trafficking and extortion. 
 
Drug traffickers are most active in eight of Guatemala’s 22 
departments: Huehuetenango and San Marcos (which border 
Mexico in the south); the tropical Petén in the north; Zacapa 
and Izabal on the Honduran border; rugged Alta Verapaz and 
Quiché in the center; and Jutiapa on the Pacific coast.  
Narcotraffickers operate with relative impunity in their areas 
of control and now contest state authority in about half of the 
country.  Massive financial resources and superior weaponry 
(armor-piercing ammunition, fragmentation grenades) enable 
Mexican DTOs to coopt or coerce local cooperation 
wherever they go.   
 
Guatemalan and foreign drug traffickers have long 
collaborated with well-connected clandestine security 
networks that Guatemalans refer to as the “parallel or hidden 
powers.”  These domestic criminal organizations provide 
intelligence and high-level political contacts to clients and 
                                                             
6 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, Vol. I, March 2011, 270-272. 
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carry out a wide range of criminal activities on their own 
(arms trafficking, money laundering, and extortion).  Parallel 
powers initially grew out of Guatemalan military intelligence 
(D-2) which directed the armed forces’ successful 
counterinsurgency campaign.  While still in uniform, senior 
officers like General Francisco “Paco” Ortega Menaldo7 
formed secret organizations such as the Cofradía 
(Brotherhood) and put their skills to criminal uses.  In 1996, 
the former military intelligence chief was cashiered from the 
army for his alleged participation in a contraband ring with 
customs officials.  He resurfaced in 2000 as the top security 
advisor to President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) who is 
himself now under U.S. indictment for money laundering.  
From this position, Ortega Menaldo exercised control over 
all military appointments despite the fact that the U.S. 
government signaled its disapproval by withdrawing his visa 
on suspicion of drug trafficking.8  More recently, President 
Alvaro Colom (2008-2012) also has relied on Ortega 
Menaldo’s security advice, and the former general has 
reasserted his influence over the military hierarchy.9  The 
Cofradía has long since splintered into different factions, and 
new parallel powers unconnected to military intelligence 
have arisen, but Ortega Menaldo’s network is still 
formidable.  These criminal organizations have placed agents 
throughout Guatemala’s government and criminal justice 
system.   
 
                                                             
7 Michael Deibert, “Guatemala’s Death Rattle: Drugs vs. Democracy,” 
World Policy Journal 25, no. 4, (Winter 2008/2009): 170.  
8 J. Mark Ruhl, “The Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords:  The 
Fate of Reform Under Arzú and Portillo,” Latin American Politics and 
Society 47 no. 1 (Spring 2005): 68-69. 
9 José Rubén Zamora, “El regreso de Ortega Menaldo,” El Periódico, 
January 11, 2008. 
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An estimated 14,000 urban gang members10 constitute 
another growing source of criminal activity. Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its smaller rival Calle 18/Mara 18 
(M-18), both of which originated in Los Angeles, California, 
control major sections of Guatemala City’s poor barrios. 
These transnational criminal organizations dominate the 
retail sale of narcotics and extort money from businesses, 
bus drivers, and residents. More than 170 bus drivers and 
other transportation workers were murdered by gangs in 
2010.11 MS-13 and M-18 also engage in kidnapping, 
robbery, car theft, and murder for hire.  Both gangs recruit 
locally among the urban poor and welcome members who 
continue to be deported from the United States.  The gangs’ 
relationships with DTOs and the parallel powers are not well 
understood.  The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) 
claims that the Sinaloa cartel has contracted Mara 
Salvatrucha to move drugs and human cargo.12 
 
A WEAK CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Guatemala’s National Civilian Police (PNC), its Public 
Ministry (Attorney General’s Office), and its courts have 
proven too weak to handle the security challenges posed by 
drug traffickers, parallel powers, and urban gangs.  The 
police force numbers only 25,500 with about one-fifth of its 
officers relegated to guarding government buildings and 
individuals.  Only a small number of PNC officers are 
assigned to important drug trafficking departments such as 
                                                             
10 See Hal Brands, Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case 
Study in the Erosion of the State (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, May 2010), 24. 
11 Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, Central America Regional 
Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2011), 10. 
12 Megan McAdams, “Bloodshed in Guatemala as Cartels and Street 
Gangs Wage War,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Last modified 
March 7, 2011. http://www.coha.org.  
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Alta Verapaz (415 officers).13  Guatemalan police are ill-
trained, underequipped, and poorly paid.  A great many of 
them engage in criminal activity themselves or take bribes to 
ignore crimes committed by others.  Morale can scarcely be 
high in a police force where senior officers are regularly 
sacked for corruption.  In 2009, the PNC’s general director, 
assistant director, and director for operations were all fired 
over 100 kilograms of missing cocaine.  Not surprisingly, 
only 31 percent of Guatemalans express trust in the police, 
the second lowest level in the Americas.14  Individuals and 
businesses that can afford to do so, have acquired private 
security, ballooning the nation’s private security force to 
125,000.  Poorer Guatemalans sometimes resort to vigilante 
justice, e.g., lynching of suspected criminals. 
 
The Public Ministry does not have enough trained 
prosecutors, forensics experts, or investigators, and it 
contains too many officials of doubtful loyalty.  Constant 
turnover in leadership has also impeded consistent policy 
formation.  Parallel powers have sometimes succeeded in 
influencing the selection of the Attorney General and other 
senior office holders.  In addition, Guatemala’s courts are 
notoriously slow, bound by archaic procedures, and open to 
manipulation by criminal defendants.  Too few convictions 
result.  Frustrated by low conviction rates, police regularly 
bypass the judicial process with extrajudicial killings of gang 
members and other suspected criminals. 
 
The failure of civilian law enforcement institutions has led 
Guatemalans from all social classes to demand that the 
                                                             
13 Steven S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: 
Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and Maras, Working Paper Series on 
U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration, Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico 
Institute and University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, May 2010, 
28. 
14 Nabeela Ahmad et al., “Trust in the National Police,” Americas 
Barometer Insights no. 59 (2011): 2. 
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military reassume a greater role in internal security in spite 
of its authoritarian history and the well-documented human 
rights abuses of the guerrilla war.  The armed forces were 
downsized by two-thirds to 15,500 effectives after the 1996 
Peace Accords and redeployed out of their rural 
counterinsurgency bases.  The removal of the military made 
it easier for drug traffickers to operate in these vacated areas.  
Despite protests from his leftist supporters, President Alvaro 
Colom has been forced by the security situation to enlarge 
the armed forces to over 17,000, expand its participation in 
urban law enforcement, and send it back into some of its 
former areas of operation.  Colom has placed soldiers on city 
buses and increased joint patrols with the police.  The 
military has constructed a new base in Quiché, and several 
hundred troops have been dispatched with temporary state of 
siege powers to Alta Verapaz and Petén. Unfortunately, the 
army is untrained in counter-narcotics operations and lacks 
necessary communications equipment, transportation, and air 
support.15  
 
The most positive development on the security front has 
been the arrival of the International Commission against 
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).  In 2007, a determined 
coalition of politicians and civil society convinced reluctant 
legislators to agree to a United Nations (UN) plan to create 
CICIG to help local prosecutors and police fight organized 
crime.  The externally-financed commission is composed of 
experienced law enforcement professionals from around the 
world who have taught new investigative and prosecutorial 
techniques, vetted candidates for senior law enforcement 
positions, and made recommendations for changes to 
Guatemala’s legal code.16  CICIG has also spearheaded a 
                                                             
15 Matthew B. Greco, Ungoverned Spaces in Guatemala and U.S. 
National Security, U.S. Army War College Program Research Project, 
May 4, 2009, 6. 
16 See the CICIG website at http://www.cicig.org for current projects. 
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number of high-profile investigations and raised the morale 
of honest Guatemalan law enforcement personnel. Although 
the commission has experienced its share of disappointments 
and controversy, it has compiled an impressive list of 
achievements in a short period:  
 
 CICIG investigators solved the bizarre Rosenberg 
murder case17 that threated to bring down the 
Colom government.  Before arranging his own 
assassination, prominent businessman Rodrigo 
Rosenberg had recorded a videotape falsely 
blaming his murder on the President. 
 
  CICIG was responsible for purging the PNC of 
over 2,000 corrupt police officers including 50 
senior officials.  Two former PNC Directors and 
their chief assistants were later convicted and 
imprisoned.  Ten compromised Public Ministry 
prosecutors resigned under pressure. 
 
 CICIG increased the transparency of the 
nominating process for attorney generals and 
judges and prevented a number of individuals 
with suspected criminal ties from gaining these 
high offices. 
 
 CICIG persuaded the Guatemalan Congress to 
pass laws giving police and prosecutors powerful 
new crime-fighting tools (legal wiretaps, witness 
protection program, plea bargaining options, asset 
seizure law). 
 
                                                             
17 See David Grann, “A Murder Foretold,” The New Yorker, April 4, 
2011. 
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 CICIG played a key role in preventing the escape 
of indicted former President Alfonso Portillo to 
Belize, and the commission is appealing his 
acquittal on embezzlement charges while 
supporting a U.S. request for his extradition.  
CICIG has also been instrumental in the 
indictment of many other high-ranking civilian 
and military officials several of whom have been 
convicted.   Convictions of murderers, drug 
traffickers, and kidnappers have accelerated. 
 
Despite uneven cooperation from Guatemalan governmental 
institutions, CICIG has shown that the criminal justice 
system can be made to work.  In 2009, the Guatemalan 
Congress extended CICIG’s mandate through September 
2011, and President Colom has requested that the legislators 
do so again for an additional two years.  A U.S.-supported 
Police Reform Commission headed by noted human rights 
activist Helen Mack also has begun to complement CICIG’s 
work.   
 
The Guatemalan state is still doing a poor job of providing 
security for its citizens, but with international assistance its 
performance has begun to show some improvement.  
Murders and kidnappings are down slightly, and seizures of 
guns, drugs, and cash are up.  With the support of the United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
Guatemalan security forces have substantially reduced drug 
flights into the Petén and captured important traffickers such 
as San Marcos drug boss Juan Ortiz López.  According to the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), fewer 
Guatemalans (40%) feel insecure in their neighborhoods than 
in 2004.18  In fact, Guatemala’s perceived insecurity rate fell 
                                                             
18 Dinorah Azpuru, Cultura política de la democracia en Guatemala, 
2010 (Nashville, TN: LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, December 2010), 
76. 
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to about the Latin American average in 2010.  Nevertheless, 
in the same survey, 23 percent of Guatemalans claimed that 
they themselves or someone in their family had been 
victimized by crime in the last 12 months.  Crime and 
insecurity remained the number one public issue in national 
polls. 
 
A NEGLECTED MAJORITY 
 
Traditionally, the Guatemalan state has also failed to 
adequately address the basic social needs of its poor 
majority.  Public education and health care have been sorely 
neglected, and until recently significant anti-poverty 
programs were unknown.  Guatemala ranks next to last in the 
Americas on the Human Development Index (HDI).  Almost 
half of Guatemalan children are chronically malnourished, 
and the average child completes just four years of school.19  
Half of the population lives on under US$ 2 a day, and an 
extremely poor 15 percent survive on less than a dollar a 
day.  Income and wealth in Guatemala have been distributed 
very unequally since colonial times.  Today the top 20 
percent of income earners amass 58 percent of income,20 and 
the largest 3 percent of landed estates encompass almost 
two-thirds of all agricultural land21 in a country where half of 
the population still lives in the rural areas.  Poverty, 
inequality, and a lack of social mobility promote crime as 
well as illegal migration to the United States. 
 
The Guatemalan state’s inability to deliver crucial political 
goods, like security, education, and basic economic 
                                                             
19 “The Tormented Isthmus,” 25-26. 
20 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Guatemala at a Glance, 
accessed June 15, 2011, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guatemala_statistics.html. 
21 “Torres Clears Final Hurdle,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 20, 
2011, 4. 
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assistance, has undermined its legitimacy.  Except for 
Hondurans, Guatemalans were the least likely to say that 
their nation was “making progress” in the 2010 
Latinobarómetro poll.22  Only 28 percent of Guatemalans 
expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works in 
their country.  Almost half of Guatemalans, nonetheless, still 
preferred democracy to any other political system, but this 
represented the weakest endorsement for democracy in any 
Latin American country. Lukewarm support for democracy 
leaves Guatemala vulnerable to the future appeals of 
authoritarian, populist politicians offering simple solutions to 
the country’s security and development problems.  
 
The Guatemalan state has failed to fight crime effectively or 
improve social conditions primarily because it has been 
starved for financial resources and led by an ineffectual 
political class.  Tax revenue represents only 10.3 percent of 
GDP,23 one of the very lowest levels in the Americas.  The 
nation’s traditional economic elite has fought successfully to 
keep income taxes low.  Guatemala’s wealthy claim that 
politicians and bureaucrats would only waste or steal 
additional funds.  Certainly the nation’s self-interested 
political class does not inspire confidence.  The majority of 
Guatemalan politicians enter politics to gain power and 
money for themselves and patronage for their followers.  
They accept financial support24 from whatever elite or even 
criminal interests will help them win office.  Politicians 
organize ephemeral, personalistic political parties that stand 
for little and disappear when their political bosses’ fortunes 
                                                             
22 “The Latinobarómetro Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist, 
December 4, 2010, 51. 
23 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, 270.  
24 See Anita Isaacs, “Guatemala on the Brink,” Journal of Democracy 21 
no. 2 (April 2010): 115. 
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fade.25  Elected legislators switch parties at will and supply 
no dependable legislative coalitions for Guatemala’s one-
term presidents to lead.  Political corruption appears to have 
declined since alleged embezzler Alfonso Portillo left office 
in 2004; but the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
still classifies the country’s corruption level as “serious.”  It 
is little wonder that ordinary Guatemalans have so little 
respect for political parties.  
 
ELECTIONS, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, AND 
MIFAPRO 
 
Unlike failed states such as Zimbabwe or the Congo, the 
Guatemalan state is doing some things reasonably well.  The 
respected Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) has conducted 
three free and fair general elections since the Peace Accords 
leading Freedom House to classify Guatemala as an electoral 
democracy.  In 2007, Alvaro Colom of the National Unity of 
Hope (UNE) became the first elected president from the left 
in more than half a century.  He rode to office on increased 
voting turnout by the rural indigenous poor that, in turn had 
been made possible by electoral reforms sponsored by his 
predecessor.  The indigenous Mayan population constitutes 
at least 50 percent of the nation and has long been the victim 
of severe discrimination.  Although the elections were 
marred by more than 50 murders of political activists and 
candidates and by the suspected influence of drug money, 
these contests represented continued democratic progress for 
a nation that was ruled by the armed forces for over forty 
years.  The upcoming September 2011 elections will be a 
fourth test of the electoral system.  Conservative former 
general Otto Pérez Molina of the Patriot Party (PP) who 
finished second in 2007 is heavily favored.  Guatemalan 
                                                             
25 Omar Sánchez, “Guatemala’s Party Universe: A Case Study in 
Underutilization, Latin American Politics and Society 50 no. 1 (Spring 
2008). 
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politicians, whatever their defects, appear, for now, to have 
accepted the basic rules of democratic electoral competition.  
No failed states are electoral democracies.   
 
Active participation by organized groups from across the 
political spectrum also has become well-established in once-
heavily-repressive Guatemala.  Not just the elite 
Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, 
Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF), but also 
human rights organizations, indigenous groups, and labor 
unions can make themselves heard, although those on the left 
still risk physical harm when they do. LAPOP surveys show 
that Guatemalans participate in religious and community 
groups and municipal meetings more than most other Latin 
Americans.26  
 
The Guatemalan state also provides capable macroeconomic 
management.  International Monetary Fund (IMF) targets for 
fiscal and monetary policy are met regularly, and the 
nation’s public debt amounts to only 20 percent of GDP.  
Guatemala’s representatives have negotiated favorable 
international trade accords such as the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR).  It is true that Guatemalan economic growth 
has trailed Latin American averages in recent years, but there 
have been none of the sharp, prolonged economic declines 
typical of failed states.  Both foreign investment and tourism 
currently are on the rise.  Economic performance, however, 
would be much stronger if crime and violence did not cost 
the nation an estimated 7.7 percent of GDP27 (security costs, 
                                                             
26 Azpuru, Cultura política, 151, 155. 
27 World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A 
Developmental Challenge, Sustainable Development Department and 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Latin America and 
the Caribbean Region (2011), 6, accessed June 17, 2011, 
http://www.worldbank.org/lac.. 
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higher insurance, theft) and discourage higher levels of 
investment.  Employers also lament workers’ low skills and 
gaps in economic infrastructure, but Guatemala benefits 
from its wide variety of exports (coffee, bananas, sugar, 
crude oil, and textiles) and about US$ 4 billion in 
remittances from citizens working abroad.  
 
Social policy is finally showing signs of progress too.  Life 
expectancy (71) and literacy rates (80%) have edged upward 
in recent years while infant and maternal mortality rates have 
fallen.  Primary school attendance and infant immunization 
rates have increased.  Most importantly, the Colom 
government initiated a popular conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) program called My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO) in 
2008 that pays poor families US$ 40 every month as long as 
their children attend school and undergo required health 
checkups.  MIFAPRO is patterned after highly successful 
anti-poverty programs in Mexico and Brazil. The 
Guatemalan CCT currently provides benefits to 814,625 
families who represent almost half of the country’s 
extremely poor households at the cost of less than one-tenth 
of one percent of GDP.28   MIFAPRO has been directed by 
President Colom’s wife Sandra Torres who has resisted 
transparent record-keeping and tried to use the program to 
win the political allegiance of beneficiary families, but a 
recent intervention by the Constitutional Court has reduced 
her influence.  Even conservatives like Pérez Molina now 
recognize that dismantling MIFAPRO would entail too great 
a political cost.    
 
 
                                                             
28 Simone Cecchini, “Do CCT Programmes Work in Low-Income 
Countries?” International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth One 
Pager, no. 90 (July 2009). 
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GUATEMALA’S FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
Guatemala is unlikely to become a failed state in the near 
term.  An electoral democracy is in place despite its flaws, 
economic management is prudent, and a new conditional 
cash transfer program is beginning to address poverty issues.  
Security problems are extremely serious, but CICIG has 
shown that progress even here may be possible.   In order to 
become a failed state like Zimbabwe or the Congo, the 
Guatemalan state’s mixed performance in providing political 
goods would have to deteriorate dramatically.  The greatest 
potential for such a state failure lies in the further expansion 
of the Mexican DTO invasion and deeper involvement of 
drug traffickers in Guatemalan electoral politics.  
 
Indicators that the risk of state failure in Guatemala is 
becoming very serious could include; 
 
1. A complete breakdown of the electoral system 
involving the use of violence on a broad scale by 
major political competitors; 
2. A takeover of formal political power by drug-
trafficking organizations (thinly disguised); 
and/or,  
3. A sharp, extended decline in GDP.    
 
In contrast, a major strengthening of the state could be 
indicated by such developments: 
 
1. A large increase in tax revenue via a new income 
tax; 
2. A thorough reform and expansion of the PNC by 
50 percent or more; 
18 
 
3. The de-politicization and enlargement of 
MIFAPRO to cover 100 percent of the nation’s 
extremely poor.   
 
While Guatemala is unlikely to become a failed state 
anytime soon, it is also difficult to imagine such positive 
improvements as these in the current political context.  
Reformist President Colom lacked the legislative majority to 
pass even modest fiscal reform measures much less more far-
reaching programs.  Moreover, his party, --the Unidad 
Nacional de la Esperanza [National Unity for Hope (UNE)] 
-- is no more ideologically coherent or deeply rooted among 
ordinary people than any others in Guatemala.  Colom also 
accepted campaign money from many questionable donors 
and sought security advice from a former general who is 
reputed to lead one of the parallel powers.  Guatemala is 
most likely to remain a weak and troubled state for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
The next Guatemalan president will probably be 
conservative Otto Pérez Molina whose Patriot Party (PP) 
symbol is a clenched fist.  Many analysts perceive him to be 
an extreme right-wing politician and link him to human 
rights crimes and parallel powers.  However, evidence for 
the most damaging accusations against him is weak,29 and it 
is worth remembering that Pérez Molina was considered one 
of the army’s most prominent moderate officers in the 1990s.  
He played a key pro-democracy role in blocking President 
Jorge Serrano’s attempted coup in 1993 and helped negotiate 
the Peace Accords which many others in the armed forces 
had resisted.  Although Pérez Molina will not be friendly to 
innovative social policies, his thorough understanding of 
Guatemala’s law enforcement institutions should help him to 
                                                             
29 Claims that Pérez Molina was involved in the 1998 assassination of 
Bishop Juan Gerardi are particularly unconvincing inasmuch as they are 
based on the accusations of a single, unreliable source. 
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address the nation’s security crisis.  The PP leader is also a 
longtime enemy30 of ex-general Ortega Menaldo whose 
influence will decline after the new president takes office.  
Pérez Molina’s elite supporters will not want him to pursue 
meaningful tax reform, but if anyone could accomplish this 
goal in Guatemala it would probably be someone with 
conservative credentials such as his. 
 
What should the United States and the international 
community do to address Guatemala’s vulnerabilities and 
increase the chances that the state will become stronger 
rather than weaker in coming years?  The first step for the 
United States should be to greatly expand its Central 
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).  CARSI 
began in FY2008 as part of the Bush administration’s Mérida 
Initiative and emerged as a separate program in FY2010.31  
CARSI currently supplies equipment (weapons, X-ray cargo 
scanners, night vision goggles, radios, and helicopters), 
training for specialized vetted units, and technical assistance 
(community-policing techniques) to more trustworthy 
elements within Guatemalan law enforcement.  It also funds 
programs to deal with the social conditions that contribute to 
crime (at-risk youth activities).  Unfortunately, with the US 
government focused on drug trafficking in Mexico, CARSI 
has been underfunded.  The US$ 100 million that President 
Obama administration requested for CARSI for all of the 
Central America countries in FY2011 is woefully 
insufficient to have the desired effect on Guatemala’s multi-
dimensional security crisis.  Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, however, promised more generous security 
assistance at the June 2011 Central American Security 
Conference.  In addition, the World Bank and Inter-
                                                             
30 Deibert, “Guatemala’s Death Rattle,” p. 171; Ruhl, “The Guatemalan 
Military,” p. 72. 
31 See Meyer and Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative, 
pp.  19-27. 
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American Development Bank together pledged US$ 1.5 
billion to fight organized crime in the region. 
 
The United States and its allies should also lobby for the 
continuation and expansion of the United Nations’ CICIG 
mission and continue to support the work of the new Police 
Reform Commission.  In addition, the international 
community must stand ready to protect the independence of 
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) whose 
professionalism undergirds Guatemala’s electoral democracy 
and to assist the TSE as it develops its capacity to monitor 
campaign finance sources.32  Deeper involvement of rival 
drug traffickers in political campaigns would subvert the 
democratic process and raise the potential for increased 
political violence.  Another high international priority should 
be support for the de-politicization and expansion of 
MIFAPRO, a CCT program which has the potential to 
reduce extreme poverty substantially.   
 
International efforts alone, however, will never be able to 
strengthen the Guatemalan state sufficiently to end concerns 
about its possible failure.  A segment of Guatemala’s 
political elite must develop the vision and political will to 
reform the tax code, the criminal justice system, and social 
policy so as to create a context in which international 
assistance can be most effective.  A reform coalition is 
desperately needed.  Regrettably, Guatemala lacks a strong, 
policy-oriented, mass-based political party that could 
develop a coherent national reform plan and mobilize public 
support around it.   
 
 
                                                             
32 Carolina Gamazo,  “Tribunal Supremo Electoral pública lista de 
financistas de PP y UNE,” El Periódico, June 26, 2011. 
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